Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

15 March 1983

Mr. Brian V. Kinney
Chief, Declassification and
Historical Research Branch
Records Management Division
Washington Headquarters Services
Room 1D517, Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Kinney:

Mr. E. E. Lowry's memorandum of 4 March 1983 entitled "Historical Research By a Former Presidential Appointee" forwarded to us for review a copy of eight items consisting of additional "Notes" made from DOD documents during research for the memoirs of Thomas S. Gates. The first seven of these Notes are concerned with Laos in 1960 and are dated respectively 4 March, 15 March, 17 June, 9 August, 11 August, 17 August, and 1 or 10 October of that year. Item No. 8 is entitled: "Notes on Memo, 6 October 1960, Subj: Cuba, HR-154-Gates."

We reviewed these Notes and have no objection to their release for use by Mr. Gates. We would like to confirm, however, that in accordance with your procedures we shall be permitted to conduct a final security review of Mr. Gates' manuscript prior to publication. Your List of Attachments and copies of the Notes are returned herewith. We have added a classification review stamp to the Notes showing our action.

Sincerely,

[redacted] 25X1

Chief, Classification Review Division
Office of Information Services
Directorate of Administration

Enclosures:
1. List of Attachments
2. Items on the List

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURES

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/encls
1 - CRD Liaison w/DOD w/encls
1 - CRD Chrono w/o encls

[redacted] 25X1

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Page Denied

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

March 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Historical Research By A Former Presidential Appointee

In accordance with the provisions of section 4.3 of Executive Order 12356 and implementing regulations, Mr. Thomas S. Gates has been authorized access to records in OSD files that he originated, reviewed, signed or received while he served as Deputy Secretary of Defense (May-December 1959) and Secretary of Defense (December 1959-January 1961).

During research for the Gates memoirs, the attached notes have been made from classified material originated by your agency or from classified subject matter of possible interest to you. This office is responsible for ascertaining your opinion as to whether these notes may be used in the preparation of the Gates book which is to be published in unclassified form. If your judgement is that the notes cannot be released in their entirety, please indicate those portions which need to be excised in order to make the notes releasable. It should be emphasized that you are not being asked to review for declassification the documents from which the notes were taken. I request that you examine the attached notes and inform this office as soon as possible, but no later than 60 days from the date of this memorandum, whether you approve their release. Please return the notes when your review has been completed. It is likely that we will be sending you additional notes as the research for the Gates memoirs progresses.

In accordance with established DoD procedures, Mr. Gates will be required to submit the manuscript of the memoirs to this office for a final security review prior to publication.

Brian McKinney for
E. E. Lowry, Jr.
OSD Records Administrator

Attachments (8)

UNCLASSIFIED

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS

A130673

SECRET

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

1. Notes on Memo for Record, 4 Mar 60, Subj: Status of Laos Programs, HR-130-Gates (S)

2. Notes on Memo, 15 Mar 60, Subj: Rural Support in Laos, HR-131-Gates (S)

3. Notes on Memo, 17 Jun 60, Subj: Control of Constabulary Forces in Laos, HR-132-Gates (S)

4. Notes on Memo, 9 Aug 60, Subj: Revolt in Laos, HR-138-Gates (S)

5. Notes on Memo, 11 Aug 60, Subj: Laos, HR-141-Gates (S)

6. Notes on Memo, 17 Aug 60, Subj: Necessity for Decisions w/respect to Laos, HR-143-Gates (S)

7. Notes on Memo, 1 Oct 60, Subj: Talking Paper Re: Pay for Phoumi Forces, HR-148-Gates (S)

8. Notes on Memo, 6 Oct 60, Subj: Cuba, HR-154-Gates (C)

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Title of Document: Memo For RECORD
Date: 4 March 1960
Subject: Status of Laos program
Folder: Laos 1960 091

02-74-38-Z-1
Accession Number: 14A-2095
Security Class. Secret

SECRET

PERSONNEL: PEO strength as of 31 Jan. 1960

	Assigned	Attached
military	48	135
Civilian	41	3

(The authorized assigned strength of the PEO is 99 military and 27 U.S. Civilians.)

RELIEF of TRAINING TEAMS: Relief of U.S. Army Special Forces Training Teams in Laos began 13 January w/ departure of first of the 3 increments from Ft Bragg; succeeding increments departed on 15 and 17 January; teams being relieved in Laos departed on 27, 29, 31 January.

TRAINING: Accomplishments of Special Forces Training Teams during their 6 mos in Laos were substantial in spite of outbreak of insurgency which coincided w/ their arrival last July. Good cooperation between Lao, French, and U.S.; goal is to get U.S. training down to Battalion level. As of mid-January, 5 Co's of FAL had gone thru training program, by mid-March, approx. 8 Co's.

Six-Man Teams: The 6-man team program was upset by the outbreak of hostilities last summer. Of 6 operational in August. Number was reduced to less than 200 during most critical period of combat.

* Also involved in airfield rehab and recon. assistance.

25X1

SECRET

SA/CIA

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

41

File Location:
02-74-38-2-1
Accession Number:
(050) 64A-2093
Security Class.
Secret

Title of Document: Memo: Lansdale to Black
Date: 15 March 1962
Subject: Rural Support in Laos

SECRET

This is a belated response to your 26 January note regarding the program in Laos to develop rural support for the Gov't.

While it is true this program lacks good or proper (as reported in various cables & reports received from the Embassy and PEO), there seems to be some genuine effort to build effectively it is actually being implemented. For example, I received a discouraging report over the weekend from a Philippine member of "Operation Brotherhood" who has been in Laos in November and December. Also Col. Anderson, the Army Chief of the Joint DoD-CINCPAC Evaluation Team which surveyed PEO activities in Laos has just returned with some rather critical views regarding the effectiveness of the Army six-man "rural security" teams which are the backbone of the military effort. To further complicate matters, the Embassy is currently upset over the fact that the need of a large-scale FAL "clearing operation" which is being undertaken to bring insurgent areas under Govt control prior to the election will run well over the current budget, and CINCPAC has criticized the FAL plan.

Thus, prematurely to do any briefing of the AFPC on Laos "Budget Bingham" is leaving for Laos next week to firmly the situation. It is well aware of this problem.

25X1

SECRET

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Origin of Document: [redacted] (Gen Lemnitzer Cont. No - SD 178)
(050105D)
Title of Document: Memo: (Lansdale to
Case A501955A
Date: 14 June 1960

Title Location:
02-74-38-2
Accession Number:
64A-2093
Security Class.
SECRET

Subject: Control of Constabulary Forces in Laos

SECRET

This office endorses CINCPAC position Set forth ... which recommends the present "volunteer battalions" of [illegible] Army (ANL) be formed into [illegible] force to remain for the present under MAAG control w/ auto-Defense forces maintaining their present identity and Equipment and constabulary intend for supervision and support.

We believe that so long as the internal Communist threat to Laos continues in the present form, the operations of the Volunteer battalions (constabulary) will of necessity remain primarily military in nature. To be fully effective, both the operations of this force and the ... to Defense Support ... must be responsive ... direction by the MAAG and the RLAF Joint Command ... w/ Army operations in overall counter-Guerrilla effort. Experience in both the Philippines and Malaya has shown that centralized direction of both regular and paramilitary forces is necessary to effectively cope with a Communist guerrilla terrorist situation. The difficulties and dangers created by efforts to delimit a separation of authority and responsibility between military and civilian elements of the anti-or internal Security operations of this both and in the provision of U.S. assistance to local Security forces, are manifest in the Vietnam. Laos "current perilous [illegible] tuation."

25X1

SECRET

Attach

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

11

Title of Document: MEMO: Lansdale to Dep. SecDef J.H. Douglas
Date: 9 Aug. 60

02-74-38-2-1
Accession Number:
64A - 2093
Security Class.

Subject: Revolt in Laos - 1

SECRET

Thought to remember about Laos.

A number of factors in current situation strongly hint to me that certain French elements have engineered the revolt, in favor of Souvanna Phouma. Factors include the use of Captain Kong Le and Second Parachute Battalion to seize key places in Vientiane, the direct propaganda against U.S. military, nationals used by the revolters, and timing to coincide w/ U.S. insistence that French negotiate w/ Lao government on extent of French participation in Laos.

I have sent a note on this to CIA also calling attention to the presence in Laos of a number of Corsicans who had been connected w/ French 5th Bureau in Vietnam formerly, where somewhat similar operations need to be plotted. These Corsicans have no visible means of support in Laos, yet have lived well there.

Ex Kong Le's statement. "What led us to stage this revolution is our desire to stop the bloody civil war; eliminate greedy public servants; carry out an inquiry concerning military commanders and officials whose property amounts to much more than their monthly salaries can afford; and chase away foreign armed forces as soon as possible. 25X1

SECRET

~~FS/C 11/5 Stub~~

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Origin of Document OSD
(Dep See Ref)
Title of Document: MEMO: E.F. Black to James H. Douglas
Date: 11 August 160
Subject: Laos

File Location:
02-74-38-2-1
Accession Number:
64A 2093
Security Class.
Secret

SECRET

Reports dealing w/ Laos indicate that Sm Phoumi plans to take military actions to recapture control of Vientiane from insurgents. Phoumi talking about an air drop to recapture the capital city, counting on support from Thailand. Lansdale (H.K.) thinks it would take very little military effort for Phoumi to regain control of the situation.

Are Communists going to let situation develop in this manner? Appropriate time for a look at status of our programs in Laos with a view toward sharpening them up and making them more effective.

25X1

SECRET

Attach 5

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

17

Origin of Document: OSD (ASD/ISA)

File Location: (R-74-38-2-1

Title of Document: Memo For Secdef from ASD/ISA

Accession Number: HA-2CA3

Date: 17 Aug. '60

Security Class. Secret

Subject: Necessity for Decision w/ respect to Laos

SECRET

Premier in U.S. Embassy, now in Luang Prabang, recommends deal U.S. help Def. Min., who is planning a counter-coup and maintaining that over threw previous govt was result of coercion.

The opportunity to retain Laos as a country essentially friendly to U.S. may slip away unless we make an immediate decision to come to the assistance of Gen. Phoumi. Retention of a pro-Western Laos is important because it is a keystone in SE Asia and its loss would greatly affect our position in Thailand and Vietnam.

This office believes that Phoumi should be supported and that time is of the essence if he is to be afforded maximum opportunity for success. It is recommended that upon discussion this matter w/ State as a matter of urgency.

25X1

SECRET

DSA/CIA/State

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Origin of Document: OSD (ASD/ISA)

File Location: 02 74-38-7 1

Title of Document: ~~Agenda~~ Memo: ASD/ISA – See Def. 10 Oct 60

Date: 1 Oct 60 ~~2 Nov 60~~

Accession Number: 64A-2093

Security Class. SECRET

Subject: Talking Paper Re Pay for Phoumi Forces

SECRET

1. Pay to Phoumi Still Stalled: Sept. check just arrived.

a. Normal, "pre-coup" procedure: regional troop representatives deliver to FAL HQ in Vientiane documentation for pay. Paymasters from Vientiane delivered pay to regions. Way Phoumi wants it done.

b. Sonvanna will not send paymasters to Phoumi regions. Phoumi has to Phoumi's region to come to Vientiane. Phoumi refuses to do so.

2. Brown met [illegible] Phoumi's paymasters in Vientiane in a PEO plane. Phoumi considers this capitulation and refuses.

3. Corcoran in Thailand tried to get Phoumi to come around but failed.

(Corcoran: Are we prepared to stand pat and see disintegration of FAL outside Vientiane.

Brown: Is Phoumi prepared to see disintegration of his army over pay issue.

In meantime: Sonvanna agreed to a coalition govt w/ 2 Pathet Lao members; friendship missions to Hanoi and Peking (3) Acceptance of Soviet aid in principle.

Rec: CIA be directed to provide 1 month's pay directly to Phoumi or thru Thai intermediaries if Sonvanna not resigned by 130 ~~2~~ 1 Nov. Brown on the stick.

25X1

SECRET

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7

Origin of Document: OSD
(OSD/ISA)
Title of Document: Memo: Lansdale to Secretary Gates
Date: 6 October 1960
Subject: Cuba

File Location:
02-74-38-2-1
Accession Number:
CIA-2093
Security Class. CONFIDENTIAL
Box #1
Folder: Cuba, 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL

Current Event: Havana announced this morning that Cuba been "invaded" by a group of 27 armed persons from the U.S. including 3 Americans who had U.S. flags and one U.S. American form. A Cuban govt communique stated that this "invasion" was being countered by militia and local farmers and that it was carried by planes which direct policies of USA."

Facts are that USA has nothing to do w/ this small group of "invaders". Customs Service and U.S. Intelligence Community knows about a group of Cubans going by sea to Cuba from Florida when they moved out.

Implication: Appears to be a private expedition, supported by a wealthy Cuban (former Senator Manuel Fernandez), who was a close associate of Batista & knows refugees in U.S. might be his operation engineered by Castro; useful to him if he could make an issue "Evidence" of U.S. interference in Cuba's internal affairs. Must expect a number of such Castro-Communist engineered operations.

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

~~S/State~~/CIA

Attach 8

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/14 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400080006-7